The United Nations in International History (New Approaches to International History) by Amy L. Sayward

Author:Amy L. Sayward [Sayward, Amy L.]
Language: eng
Format: azw3
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
Published: 2017-02-23T05:00:00+00:00

The U.N. role during the Suez Crisis

The outbreak of war in the Middle East in the fall of 1956 had been brewing for some time, despite efforts by the chief of staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and Secretary-General Hammarskjöld. Egyptian restrictions on Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran (at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba—see Figure 7.2), Egyptian-supported raids by Palestinians against Israel from Gaza, reprisals by Israeli forces, and a regional arms race were capped off by Egyptian nationalist leader Gamal Abdul al-Nasser’s July 26, 1956, nationalization of the Suez Canal, which connected the Mediterranean and Red seas and therefore served as a vital transportation link between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Nasser’s action was intended to bring him the foreign exchange resources he needed to build the Aswan High Dam across the Nile River in his country (the keystone to his economic development plans) following the withdrawal of U.S. support for plans to obtain World Bank funding of the dam project on July 19, 1956. In the meantime, the secretary-general worked behind the scenes with all parties and worked out the six general principles for a settlement of the “Suez question” that were incorporated into Security Council Resolution 118: free and open transit through the canal, respect for Egyptian sovereignty, apolitical operation of the canal, jointly agreed upon tolls and charges, an equitable apportionment of all collected fees to Egyptian development, and fair resolution of all disputes through arbitration. But while Hammarskjöld was preparing for peace, Israel, France, and Great Britain had been preparing for war. UNTSO Chief of Staff Major-General E. L. M. Burns of Canada reported the Israeli violation of the Egyptian border on the Sinai Peninsula in the early hours of October 30, 1956, and called upon the encroaching troops to cease their fire and pull back to their side of the border. President Eisenhower was incensed at the aggression, which distracted from the recent uprising against the communist regime in Hungary and came just before the presidential election. The United States called an emergency session of the Security Council and condemned the action; the session was interrupted by news that the French and British had issued ultimatums to the warring parties (which Nasser rejected, according to plan, providing the pretext for Anglo-French intervention). When the Council reconvened that evening, France and Britain vetoed a resolution condemning Israel and calling on all states to avoid the use of force (this was the first U.K. veto in the Security Council). The United States responded by calling the first emergency special session of the U.N. General Assembly, which met on November 1, 1956, one day after the British Royal Air Force began bombing Egyptian airfields. It was certainly remarkable that the United States was now using the same tactic—taking a key issue out of the Security Council to get around the use of the veto—against its traditional allies that it had earlier used against the Soviet Union in garnering ongoing support of the Korean War effort.

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